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ABSTRACT. Ecosystem services are necessary, yet not sufficient for human well-being (however defined).
Insufficient access to the ecosystem provisioning service of food is a particularly important factor in the
loss of human well-being, but all ecosystem services contribute in some way to well-being. Although
perhaps long obvious to ecologists, the links between ecosystems and aspects of human well-being,
including health, have been less well understood among the social science community. This situation may
now be starting to change, thanks in part to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). Causality between
ecosystem services and well-being is bidirectional; it is increasingly clear that functioning societies can
protect or enhance ecosystem services, and accordingly, that societies with impaired well-being (best
documented in the case of chronic diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS) can also experience a related
decline in ecosystem services.
The future state of human well-being and of ecosystem services is more than the co-evolution of these two
fundamental elements. Human well-being also depends, critically, upon the human institutions that govern
relationships between human individuals and groups, and also between humans and ecosystem services.
The scenarios working group of the MA found that human well-being is highest in the Global Orchestration
scenario, which assumes the fastest evolution of beneficial institutions, and is lowest in the Order from
Strength scenario. Human well-being was found to be intermediate in the other two scenarios (Adapting
Mosaic and Techno-Garden) even though these scenarios share a much greater recognition of the importance
of ecosystem services to human well-being.
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INTRODUCTION: ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING
The concept of human well-being is complex,
controversial, and continually evolving. The
linkages between human well-being and ecosystem
services are even more complex. And although
some of these links are recognized, many remain
poorly understood and controversial (Balmford et
al. 2005, Butler et al. 2003).
Ecosystem services are clearly necessary, yet not
sufficient for human well-being. Humans are social,
thinking, and hierarchical beings. Context,
expectations, relationships, social position, and a
sense of participation and inclusion have many
bearings on the subjective experience of well-being.
These have little to do with ecosystem services
directly. In addition, human actors, operating at
scales that are local, regional, and increasingly,
global, have a substantial influence on the
availability and quality of ecosystem services.
Increasingly, human actions have remote effects,
including on other people who are effectively
invisible, far removed by distance, culture, and
socioeconomic position.
A continuous supply of ecosystem services is
integral to provide many material factors essential
for human well-being, such as shelter, clothing,
food, and livelihood. But once a material minimum
is attained, human well-being is substantially
experiential. These non-material aspects of human
well-being have been defined as including good
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health, a sense of security, good social relations,
freedom, and choice (Butler et al. 2003). These
idealized components of well-being should not be
confused with a life free from all difficulty. The life
of virtually every human being has some pain and
suffering, and experiences such as occasional
bereavement and anxiety do not necessarily signify
poor human well-being. However, many people
with poor well-being have lives in which suffering
is pervasive, and in which hope, opportunity, and
freedom are perennially limited.
Even though some of the main elements of human
well-being (including the feeling of security) can be
considered psychological, these psychological
aspects are shaped by and reflect material
circumstances, including access to adequate
ecosystem services. In many cases, an insufficiency
or maldistribution of ecosystem services contributes
to a sense of insecurity, and often, to poor social
relations. This insufficiency may, in some cases, be
subjectively perceived, rather than observed by a
“dispassionate” watcher. Adams et al. (2003) point
out that conflicts over the management of common
pool resources are rarely if ever purely “material,”
but rather are crucially dependent on the perceptions
of the protagonists. They also point out that decision
makers and stakeholders, particularly if from
different backgrounds, are likely to differ in their
access to and understanding of diverse sources of
knowledge. In some cases, religious beliefs and
moral conviction are also important in structuring
understanding and determining conflict or its
absence.
The apprehension of “future” ecosystem service
insufficiency appears to sometimes impel more
powerful groups to act pre-emptively to protect their
existing resource access, even though that access is,
by definition, disproportionately high. An example
of this appears to have occurred during the Rwandan
genocide, in which much conflict arose over the
struggle to control productive land, and hence to
capture and retain the security that access to the
ecosystem services of productive land affords.
Many instigators and victors of this conflict were
not completely impoverished or landless, but appear
to have been slightly better off than the poorest and
most vulnerable. Responding to a social milieu that
briefly permitted and even promoted extreme
violence, many of this group appear to have used
the opportunity of genocide to increase their
comparative affluence. In contrast, some of the
absolute poorest (who disproportionately succumbed
in the genocide) had committed comparatively
minor crimes in the period before the genocide.
These people, known as “voleurs par faim” (thieves
by reason of hunger), were generally tolerated
before the genocide, but were probably
disproportionately vulnerable during it (André and
Platteau 1998).
Although understanding of the emergence of the
Rwandan genocide remains inadequate and
contested, a relationship between conflict and the
perception of actual—and a future worsening of—
ecosystem scarcity seems undeniable. Many other
conflicts, both historical and contemporary, are also
related to the control of productive land, valued
because of its ability to provide ecosystem services.
Soil Depletion, Poor Nutrition, and Human
Well-being
The title and content of a recent article in the leading
medical journal The Lancet, “Hunger in Africa: the
link between unhealthy people and unhealthy soils”
(Sanchez and Swaminathan 2005), reflect a
welcome and growing recognition of the link
between ecosystem services and human well-being
within parts of the health and social science
literature. However, only a moment’s reflection is
needed to realize that the causal relationship
between tired, nutrient-depleted soil and tired, sick
people is bidirectional and reinforcing (see Fig. 1).
In other words, populations that experience poverty
and ill-health, in part because of under-nutrition and
material lack from soil exhaustion, are also likely
to be relatively deficient in the human capability
needed to improve local soil quality.
Sanchez and Swaminathan (2005) state that “the
major economic reason for lack of fertilizer input
has been the poor infrastructure in rural areas of sub-
Saharan Africa.” However, calling this the “major”
reason is misleading. It is well recognized that the
cost of transport of both crop inputs (e.g., fertilizer)
and outputs (e.g., cash crops) inhibits economic
development in many parts of Africa, by making
locally grown crops too expensive to compete with
cheaper imported food (Verhye 2000). However,
the quality of transport systems in many parts of
sub-Saharan Africa has deteriorated in recent
decades, and this in turn has numerous causes,
including some that are economic, some that are
local, and some that are global.
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Fig. 1. A complex, interlinked network of factors operate to perpetuate poverty in much of the
developing world, including sub-Saharan Africa. Literally dozens of economic, political, and social
factors can be identified as contributing to a causal web that effectively serves to lock in poverty, poor
governance, and undernutrition. Many of these factors are bi-directional, such as the relationship
between poor governance, chronic disease, and poverty. Successful implementation of the Green
Revolution appears to be an important factor that could alleviate much of the poverty in sub-Saharan
Africa. However, a plethora of factors (some of which are global) inhibit this. The figure attempts to
convey the as yet undelivered promise of the Green Revolution as lightning flashes that try, but
ultimately fail, to connect (and thus alleviate) governance and soil nutrient depletion.
In fact, as partly recognized by Sanchez and
Swaminathan (2005), a vicious circle of factors
operates to perpetuate poverty in much of the
developing world, including in sub-Saharan Africa.
Literally dozens of economic, political, and social
factors can be identified as contributing to a causal
web that effectively serves to lock in poor soil
quality. Some of these factors, such as co-existent
disease (e.g., malaria, HIV/AIDS, and the usual
diseases of poverty caused by contaminated water,
food, air, and soil), poor governance (e.g.,
corruption, capital flight, brain and talent drain, high
indebtedness, and mismanagement), and lack of
education, credit, and adequate transport are shown
in Fig. 1. When these factors are combined with the
need for an annual harvest, together with the
additional demand created by a growing population
(co-existent in many parts of the developing world
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marked by undernutrition), it is clear that, without
counter-measures, soil “mining” will aggravate the
depletion of soil nutrients, and thus ongoing soil and
human poverty. Impoverished humans, without
assistance, are unlikely to break out of this cycle, in
which ecosystem services and human well-being
both decline.
The Human Factors that Steal Intelligence
from More than Two Billion People
A lack of access to the ecosystem provisioning
service of food causes far more than psychological
harm: it robs thousands of millions of people of
mental and physical potential by reducing
intelligence and physical growth, in some cases
from the moment of human conception.
Undernutrition was recently assessed as an
underlying cause of more than half of the 10.6
million deaths that occur each year, worldwide, of
children under the age of five (Bryce et al. 2005).
Undernutrition is particularly common in sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, especially in India
(de Onis et al. 2004). In association with other
factors such as disease and environmental
contamination, it robs as many as one in three of the
6.5 billion people alive today of part of their
potential intelligence quotient. The intelligence of
populations has little if anything to do with genetic
factors, but much to do with human access to
adequate nutrition (Grantham-McGregor 2002),
vulnerability to disease (Dillingham and Guerrant
2004), access to stimulation and opportunity, and
exposure to certain forms of pollution, such as lead
(Tong et al. 2000).
Undernutrition is more than an inadequate intake of
energy and protein in food: it also refers to more
subtle deficiencies of micro-nutrients, particularly
of iron, which is essential to deliver oxygen to tissue,
and thus needed for stamina. People who are
physically stunted and mentally dulled are more
vulnerable to manipulation and abuse than are those
with more advantages, opportunities, and resources.
They are also more vulnerable to diseases that lead
to further impairment, such as malaria, tuberculosis,
and, in some cases (especially women), HIV/AIDS.
Despite periodic waves of public support for Third
World debt relief, the number of people who benefit
from the disadvantage of others and who are yet
prepared to reduce their own advantage is modest
at best (Pogge 2004).
Inadequate nutrition does not occur because of any
absolute, “global” shortage of calories, vitamins, or
the other micronutrients needed to ensure human
development. Instead, there is a significant
maldistribution of human access to the vital
ecosystem provisioning service of food. Amartya
Sen (1981) has described the root cause of hunger
as a lack of food “entitlement,” including the income
needed to purchase food. However, although Sen’s
concepts were a useful counterweight to a then-
prevalent view that famine was principally caused
by ecological factors, the pendulum may have
swung too far: attribution of hunger entirely to
“human” factors is itself over-simplistic.
The Interacting Social and Ecological Factors
that Reduce Access to Provisioning Ecosystem
Services
The great Bengali famine, which caused over three
million premature deaths during World War II, was,
as Sen has shown, aggravated by human action (Sen
1981). The response of the British-controlled Indian
government to a coalescence of environmental,
ecological, and social factors that had depressed the
1942 rice supply (a cyclone followed by flooding
and a fungal outbreak in Bengal was exacerbated
by loss of rice imports from Burma, then held by
the Japanese) can be seen, in hindsight, as
dysfunctional. It led to food hoarding and a steep
increase in the price of grain. Sen found that the total
food supply in the year of maximum starvation
(1943) actually exceeded that of 1941, a year when
there was no famine. But although this famine can
be analyzed as having human causation, it also had
underlying adverse climatic and ecological factors.
The “Great Hunger” in the 1840s in Ireland, which
led to a significant depopulation because of
starvation, disease, and emigration (Woodham-
Smith 1962), can similarly be analyzed as being
generated by interacting ecological and human
factors. The current undersupply of food in
Zimbabwe is widely acknowledged to have been
worsened by poor governance, corruption, and the
replacement of the management of productive farms
by people with less human and financial capital.
Periodic drought has also played a role. As well, the
total supply of human capital in Zimbabwe has been
diminished by the devastating scale of the HIV
epidemic. This has reduced agricultural (de Waal
and Whiteside 2003) and other forms of social
capacity.
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Regulating Ecosystem Services and Human
Well-being
Regulating ecosystem services, at local, regional,
and global scales, are also important for human well-
being. Examples of regulating services include the
reduction of soil erosion by adequate vegetation,
and the buffering of coastal areas against storms and
sea surges by mangroves, (Primavera 2005)
wetlands, and beach forests (Danielson et al. 2005).
The spatially varied destruction of infrastructure
from Hurricane Mitch in 1998 (which cost 11 000
lives) was widely attributed to deforestation, as well
as waterlogging, poverty, and inadequate
evacuation (Hellin et al. 1999). A recent review
(FAO and CIFOR 2005) has questioned the capacity
of forests and forest litter to govern water flow
through mitigation of floods, some landslips, and
by maintaining water flow during dry periods.
However, rather than denying that any such
regulating function exists, this report stresses the
role of contributing factors, pointing out that many
floods are inevitable even where forests are intact.
Regulating services also contribute to provisioning
services, e.g., by reducing soil erosion and
providing micro-climatic conditions beneficial to
crop production. On a global scale, climate is in part
regulated by ecosystems, including land cover, soil
organisms, and phytoplankton (Falkowski et al.
2000).
There is compelling evidence that many tribal,
traditional, and historical societies had (and in some
cases still possess) an understanding of the
importance of ecosystem regulating services. This
is demonstrated by, e.g., customs that help retain
biodiversity, protect against excessive land
clearing, and maintain water quality (Kirch 1997,
Ramakrishnan et al. 1998, Atran et al. 1999, Berkes
et al., 1998, Berkes 2003, Folke 2004).
Correspondingly, there is substantial evidence that,
today, a large and growing gap separates many
people, especially those in urban areas, from
sufficient appreciation of the importance of many
regulating (and even provisioning) ecosystem
services.
Cultural Ecosystem Services and Human Well-
being
Cultural ecosystem services refer to the aesthetic,
spiritual, psychological, and other non-material
benefits that humans obtain from contact with
ecosystems. Many indigenous people retain
heartfelt, spiritual bonds with sacred landscapes,
groves, and species. Many people, uprooted from
intense daily contact with nature, nevertheless
appear to appreciate and benefit from cultural
ecosystem services (Frumkin 2002). Such contact
need not be direct, as illustrated by the popularity
of the virtual experience of distant ecosystems. Nor
need such contact be exotic, as shown by the
ubiquity of gardens, pets, potplants, and images of
nature on computer screens.
Cultural services contribute especially to health.
Many farmers form emotional bonds with the herds
and flocks they depend upon for their livelihood
(Zinsstag and Weiss 2001). Hospitalized patients
recover faster if they can look out a window facing
trees instead of bare walls (Ulrich 1984). Contact
with pets improves health for survivors of
myocardial infarction (Friedmann and Thomas
1995), reduces the incidence of minor health
problems (Serpell, 1991), and improves the health
of isolated and aged individuals.
Many cultures and societies retain a myth of an
Eden, an attractive, harmonious, and idyllic
environment, characterized by an abundant supply
of ecosystem services in proportion to the human
demands for these services. Many wealthy
individuals exhibit an appreciation for cultural
ecosystems, e.g., by living in comparatively leafy
suburbs or estates, or by holidaying in areas that are
remote, beautiful, and comparatively wild.
The seemingly simple, obvious love and
appreciation of many humans for nature may
actually be profound. Biophilia (Wilson 1984) may
express an innate human attraction to nature (Berkes
et al. 1998), plausibly reflecting an evolutionarily
driven understanding of human dependence upon
ecosystem services. The neural links that express
the emotional and experiential sensation of biophilia
may be hard-wired into the human brain, both
reflecting and helping to preserve many
provisioning and regulating services. If so, this
illustrates another example of the complex dynamic
relationship between ecosystem services and human
well-being.
Yet despite the plausibility of this hard-wiring,
competitive forces have driven many societies to
consistently sacrifice cultural and regulating
ecosystem services for more prosaic needs,
especially for provisioning services. In China, for
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example, nature has been relentlessly transformed;
even as whole forests have been transformed to
agricultural fields, some individual trees were
retained and venerated (Elvin 2004, Tickell 2004).
Many wetlands and mangroves have been cleared
to improve provisioning services, such as shrimp
farming (Primavera 2005).
SCALE, POWER, AND ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES
Issues of scale and external force have frequently
overwhelmed the capacity of local populations to
apply customs and knowledge to maintain
provisioning, regulating, and culturally enriching
services critical for well-being. These services have
sometimes been deliberately eroded by the actions
of more powerful populations, seeking to enhance
their own well-being. The slaughter of the buffalo
in the American Midwest undermined the food
supply for Amerindian populations; its cruelty and
waste undoubtedly damaged morale, through loss
of a key cultural (as well as a provisioning) service.
The loss of the buffalo must also have altered the
regulating service provided to the prairie by these
large and numerous grazers. The invading human
population was then able to establish a different
provisioning service—the raising of crops and
cattle.
Similar processes continue today in many
developing countries. In Indonesia, illegally
operating logging gangs contribute to the rapid
disappearance and fragmentation of forests and
cultures (Jepson et al. 2001). The seasonal haze over
large parts of Southeast Asia, caused by land
clearing, peat fires (Page et al. 2002), and logging,
reflects both local and external factors. Although
land clearing by burning is a traditional practice in
this part of the world, the vast haze during the severe
El Niño of 1997–1998, which speculatively could
be evidence of anthropogenic climate change
(Trenberth and Hoar 1996), was of unprecedented
size (Siegert et al. 2001). It caused significant
adverse health and economic effects, including for
many urban populations.
The unusually severe drought in the Sahel in the
1970s reduced Sahelian provisioning services,
leading to the starvation of up to a million people
(Foley et al. 2003). More recently, there has been
appreciation that the unusual severity of this
drought, especially in the eastern Sahel, may have
been caused in part by climatic factors arising from
European air pollution (Lelieveld et al. 2002). If so,
this would represent an unconscious, accidental
example of resource deprivation by people in other
ways almost entirely disconnected to the Sahel
nomads. The forecast impact upon low-lying island
states because of sea-level rise, extreme weather
events, and other manifestations of global climatic
change is a less benign illustration of how powerful,
distant, and large-scale actors continue to act
remotely in ways that will damage ecosystem
services vital for the well-being of other (less
powerful) humans. A similar case is the pollution
of rivers by foreign mining companies seeking to
maximize profit, that results in loss of ecosystem
services, such as occurred when tailings from a mine
in Papua New-Guinea contaminated the Fly and Ok
Tedi rivers (Macintyre and Foale 1997). In all these
cases, more powerful, often remote, populations are
damaging local ecosystem services in ways that
enhance their own well-being at the expense of
local, less powerful communities.
The Distribution of Ecosystem Services and
Human Well-being
The distribution of human well-being follows the
distribution of its constituents and determinants
(such as income, hunger, food, freedom, and choice)
in being grossly unequal. The per capita access to,
and use of, ecosystem services is also distributed in
a highly unequal way, but one that may be less
skewed than that of well-being as a whole. For
example (and despite the examples above), some
indigenous peoples still retain access to a
comparatively high per capita supply of locally
available provisioning, regulating, and culturally
enriching services. However, the well-being of
many of these people is rarely as proportionally
high, because of factors such as a low monetary
income, disease, and associated vulnerability.
The constituents of well-being for many tribal and
indigenous people are vulnerable to many outside
forces, some of which operate unintentionally,
rather than as deliberately oppressive instruments.
For example, many indigenous populations in the
Amazon now experience outbreaks of malaria,
introduced by infected human migrants and
disseminated by mosquitoes whose abundance has
been increased by landscape changes, including
deforestation and the introduction of water-holding
plastic containers, which accumulate as litter (Patz
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et al. 2004). In the Arctic, there is accruing evidence
for a decline in human health (including
neurodevelopment) caused by consumption of
pollutants found at high levels in fish and marine
mammals because of bioaccumulation (Webster
2004, 2005) and also because of soil contamination
at high altitudes and high latitudes (Blais et al.
1998). Although these long-range effects are rarely
deliberate, the disparity of power between the causal
and the affected population means that the injury is
likely to be long prolonged. Few industrialized
populations are likely to reduce their pollution when
the main victims are unseen, distant, and poorly
documented (Butler and McMichael 2006).
The well-being of isolated populations who retain
comparatively high access to many ecosystem
services may also, sometimes, be reduced by
exposure to other cultures. This may be fostered by
the planting and nurturing of wants that prove
impossible to achieve. In some cases, overt
exploitation and repression can occur, generating
despair, depression, alcoholism, and violence—for
which exposure or re-exposure to nature is an
insufficient healer. Sometimes, these unwanted
consequences may occur even where the per capita
access to ecosystem services of the affected
populations remains objectively high. Note,
however, that we are not arguing that indigenous
and other populations largely separated from the
modern “developed” world inhabit a kind of Eden,
in which they should be imprisoned (Mukta and
Hardiman 2000). It is, furthermore, unlikely that
well-being has ever been the universal experience
of any people; exploitation, domination, and
unhappiness are ancient phenomena (Price and
Feinman 1995).
Our point is that well-being depends on a plethora
of contextual factors, many of which cannot be
provided by access to ecosystem services. A
minimum set of ecosystem services may be
necessary for well-being, but this is rarely if ever
sufficient. However, descent into despair upon
exposure to the modern world is not inevitable. In
many cases, external social forces can create a net
benefit to well-being among populations displaced
from “traditional” lifestyles.
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN WELL-BEING
AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
The Scenarios Working Group of the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) comprised about 90
scientists from many countries. This group met
repeatedly over several years, working to develop
and refine four conceptual models of how the future
may unfold. The group used quantitative model
results and a qualitative analysis of storylines to seek
an understanding of the future status (until 2050) of
human well-being and ecosystems services. Two
scenarios (TechnoGarden and Adapting Mosaic)
assumed “proactive” environmental policies, with
a broad recognition of the need to protect, preserve,
and restore ecosystems and their services. The other
two scenarios (Global Orchestration and Order from
Strength) assumed “reactive” environmental
policies. The scenarios also differed in their
emphasis on the scale and rapidity of economic and
technological development.
The group found that well-being and ecosystem
services will vary substantially over this range of
scenarios, which differ according to their evolution
of policies, ecosystem services, and institutions (see
Table 1) (Carpenter et al. 2005).
A key finding of the MA is that many ecosystem
services are declining. In some cases, these losses
of ecosystem services are gradual, whereas in others
they are being offset by increases in some other
services. In general, regulating and culturally
enriching services are being lost at the expense of
greater provisioning services. The group found,
overall, that well-being is highest in the Global
Orchestration scenario, and lowest in the Order from
Strength scenario, which focuses primarily on
protecting the circumstances of those with existing
security.
Human Well-being in Global Orchestration
The scenario called Global Orchestration focuses
on the improvement of material income and
education in both industrialized and developing
countries. Subsidies and other barriers to free trade
are gradually removed, many institutions conducive
to well-being improve, and technologies continue
to advance. It assumes a reactive, rather than a
proactive approach to ecosystem services. There is
an assumption, albeit implicit, that the resultant
increase in social and human capital will enable
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Table 1. Well-being and ecosystem services vary substantially over these four scenarios, which differ
according to their evolution of policies, ecosystem services, and institutions.
Global orchestration. Free trade and a good heart reign in this scenario. There is a determined effort to fight poverty and
inequality. As a result, there is a huge boost in food and other provisioning services in developing countries. However, the
general approach to ecosystem services is reactive, rather than preventative. The costs are borne by regulating services—
such as climate change—and a loss in cultural services.
Order from strength. The world fragments into regional markets and alliances. Nations are obsessed with security issues,
and the tragedy of the commons deepens. Most categories of ecosystem services decline, especially in developing
countries.
TechnoGarden. This is a globally connected world, with abundant green technology, and a focus on preventing ecosystem
problems. Food and other provisions increase, although they are not maximized. Climate change, floods, and disease are of
less concern. Biodiversity continues to decline.
Adapting mosaic. The emphasis here is on local solutions. Regional politicians and institutions focus on watershed-scale
ecosystems to maximize benefits and prevent problems. If it catches on widely, it pays off. Every type of ecosystem
service improves in both developing and industrialized nations.
society to cope with any adverse ecological or social
surprise that may occur. In this scenario, incomes
improve, human capital is enhanced, and material
availability increases, because of, among other
things, more effective and fairer distributive
mechanisms. Increased wealth triggers a greater
demand for environmental amenity, and this
gradually slows some of the declines in regulating
and culturally enriching services.
Global connectedness, cooperation, and emphasis
on social as well as economic policies in this
scenario improve not only well-being, but also
enhance many forms of public good (such as human
rights, the rule of law, democracy, political freedom,
and peace). The number of underfed children is
lowest in this scenario (see Fig. 2). However, the
reactive attitude to ecosystem management leaves
society vulnerable to adverse surprises, which tend
to be belatedly recognized and poorly managed. It
is conceivable that some of these adverse ecological
surprises (e.g., pollution, erosion, coastal
eutrophication, or runaway climate change) could
surpass a threshold, overwhelming social capacity
and, consequently, damaging human well-being
(Walker and Meyers 2004).
The Global Orchestration scenario portrays a
significant improvement in provisioning ecosystem
services (see Fig. 3) and in human well-being.
However, the scenario is vulnerable to adverse
ecological surprises, which, if of sufficient scale,
may undermine and even reverse the improved
human well-being posited in this scenario.
Human Well-being in Order From Strength
Policy regarding ecosystem services is similarly
agnostic in Order from Strength as in Global
Orchestration. Wealthy societies assume that
technological innovation will overcome any
environmental challenges that would otherwise
threaten economic growth, and that ecosystem
services in industrialized nations will be largely
maintained passively, including by static or
declining population growth. In developing
countries, however, ecosystem services continue to
deteriorate because of increasing population (see
Fig. 4) and the low rate of technological advance.
In contrast to Global Orchestration, there is no
organized movement to try to improve social and
human capital. In some developing countries,
ecosystem scarcity reaches critical thresholds,
exacerbating pre-existing tension, and leading to
violent conflict.
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Fig. 2. The estimated number of undernourished children in 2050 compared
with the present is shown in each scenario. This is lowest in Global
Orchestration, but increases in Order from Strength.
 
From Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: Synthesis. Island Press, Washington, DC. Copyright © 2005
World Resources Institute. Reproduced by permission of World Resources
Institute, Washington, D.C.
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Fig. 3. Provisioning, regulating, and culturally enriching services are shown in all four scenarios,
compared with the present, for industrial and developing countries.
 
From Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Island
Press, Washington, DC. Copyright © 2005 World Resources Institute. Reproduced by permission of
World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C.
Policies driven by perceived individual and national
self-interest prevail, leaving many barriers to free
trade in place. Untrammeled market forces drive
global and domestic inequality even higher than at
present. Barriers to the movement of trade, people,
and information persist, and sophisticated security
systems and military forces try to contain and
confine the inevitable resentment and backlash that
occurs. Economic and environmental policies are
geared toward short-term solutions, without
concern over either neighbors or successive
generations.
In this scenario, a vicious circle is likely to develop,
so that deteriorating ecosystem services become
both a determinant and a consequence of declining
well-being in developing countries. Widespread
violent conflict in developing countries is plausible
in this scenario, whereas attacks by terrorists
emanating from or sympathetic to populations in
developing countries may also affect wealthy
populations.
Health in developing countries declines as a result
of a toxic mixture of poor education, low human
capital, high fertility rates, environmental
degradation, technological scarcity, and increased
inequality. Mortality increases, and both new and
old diseases return. Even in industrialized countries,
health may decline, as anxiety, stress, obesity, and
diabetes increase (Mann 2005, Olshansky et al.
2005). The number of hungry children, most of
whom live in developing countries, increases (see
Fig. 2).
Human Well-being in Adapting Mosaic and
TechnoGarden
The other two scenarios (Adapting Mosaic and
TechnoGarden) share a greater recognition of the
importance of ecosystem services for human well-
being, and gradually develop institutions and
mechanisms to ensure a continual supply of
ecosystem services. But they differ in the
technological ambition and sophistication of the
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Fig. 4. Global population is shown in each scenario from 1900 to 2100. Population increase is lowest in
Global Orchestration, peaking at just over eight billion in about 2060. Population growth is highest in
Order from Strength, where population plateaus at over ten billion at the end of this century.
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means used to achieve this. Adapting Mosaic relies
on simpler, community-based means. There is a
high degree of local ecological awareness, including
both ecological resilience and fragility, and at the
same time, sufficient autonomy exists to implement
a plethora of local strategies. These qualities
facilitate the sustainable use of ecosystems to meet
material needs.
In TechnoGarden, more reliance is placed on the
development of environmental engineering, on
climate and energy-friendly technology, and on new
ways of farming that incorporate provisioning with
regulating and cultural ecosystem services. This
scenario depicts a globally connected society that
relies on technological breakthroughs for material
provision and ecosystem restoration. This will
improve well-being because of improved eco-
efficiency in production and optimal control of
ecosystems by humans.
The quantitative findings in this scenario show a
greatly enhanced agricultural capacity, and an
enhancement of provisioning and regulating
ecosystem services (see Fig. 3). The number of
undernourished children by 2050 falls substantially,
though not by as much as in Global Orchestration
(see Fig. 2). This is because the social changes
posited in TechnoGarden do not assume as great a
convergence between industrialized and developing
countries as in Global Orchestration.
Market-oriented technology for solutions to
environmental problems will ensure sustained
provisioning services (food, water, and other
material needs) although technology failure and
misuse, as well as emphasis on the provisional role
of ecosystems could lead to a decline in regulatory,
supporting, and culturally enriching ecosystem
services.
Health in TechnoGarden improves because of
technological breakthroughs, including in preventive
medicine, nutrition, pharmaceuticals, vaccines,
surgery, and information technology. Environmental
conditions improve because of successful
environmental engineering. Genetic modification
assists the development of “nutraceuticals” that
reduce micronutrient deficiency by combining trace
elements and high levels of vitamins with staples.
Environmental engineering is also used to remediate
polluted land, water, and soil, and to reduce the
breeding of disease-transmitting vectors, such as
mosquitoes.
Technology improves communication, develops
substitutes that alleviate resource-based conflicts,
and enhances the satisfaction of aesthetic,
recreational, and educational needs. This thereby
promotes social-cultural relations among societies.
Freedom and choice increase, through both
additional products and by various production
technologies. Similarly, there is increased freedom
of communication and movement (Armey 2001).
Overall, however, human well-being does not
increase as much in these scenarios as in Global
Orchestration. In TechnoGarden, the rate of
evolution of institutions is likely to lag behind that
of technological development. New technologies
may, therefore, be misused in ways that reduce well-
being. Furthermore, the persistence of trade and
other barriers (in both Adapting Mosaic and
TechnoGarden) is likely to slow development in
poor countries, slowing the rate of poverty
alleviation.
ASSESSING THE SCENARIOS
The real future, however, is unlikely to be as simple
as suggested in any individual scenario (Butler
2005, Carpenter et al. 2006). In Adapting Mosaic,
the strength of local forces is likely to be balanced
by a commensurate weakness of many global
institutions. This creates several forms of
vulnerability. Local groups, who may themselves
be quite harmonious and peaceful, are likely to
remain vulnerable to “human predators,” including
raiders, pirates, and organized criminals. Similarly,
good local environmental management may be
overwhelmed by large-scale environmental shifts,
such as from runaway climate change, fisheries
collapses hastened by industrialized fishing
trawlers, or widespread coastal eutrophication.
Human well-being in this scenario is also placed at
risk by a likely failure to effectively respond to any
large-scale social crisis, or by the persistence of
locally sanctioned customs that harm the well-being
of women, minorities, or social reformers and
dissidents.
Human well-being in TechnoGarden is sensitive to
the rate of evolution of institutions and norms that
govern interpersonal relations. If these institutions
keep pace with technology, then the outlook for
human well-being could be bright. Humanity could
use its technologically furnished abundance to
improve nutrition, limit disease and exploitation,
Ecology and Society 11(1): 30
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art30/
and nurture creativity and freedom. But such a
utopia is unlikely—advanced technologies could
also be used to foster a dystopia of surveillance,
repression, and electronically enforced slavery.
Even if institutions are comparatively benign in this
scenario, large-scale technological and ecological
mistakes and accidents could still occur—and be on
a larger scale than in other scenarios, because of the
emphasis in this scenario upon novel and powerful
technologies. New diseases, new arms races, and
new crop vulnerabilities could develop. Although
every fire may create its extinguisher, this scenario
could unravel if some large-scale responses trigger
even larger-scale problems. Social surprises could
then develop: an over-reliance on technologies
could generate less durable, synthetic relations,
harming social cohesion.
There are many difficulties in the Global
Orchestration scenario, even if belief is sufficiently
suspended to conceive a world without agricultural
and other subsidies, and in which powerful
populations concede their relative advantage. The
2004 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to
economists for work that has shown how rarely
economic and political actions reach their desired
result, even when well intentioned (Seife 2004).
Nevertheless, this scenario, even if imperfectly
realized, appears to have the greatest chance of
stimulating the human capital, the social capital, and
the global and local institutions needed to promote
large-scale human well-being. Its great risk is that
its relative neglect of (especially regulatory and
culturally enriching) ecosystem services could
precipitate sufficient adverse ecological and social
surprises to stress, or even reverse, the
improvements in well-being that are forecast.
Order from Strength provides the least desirable
future for the global community, although it may be
perceived as the most desirable for the small fraction
of the global population that is comparatively
privileged. However, as with the other scenarios,
Order from Strength is unrealistically simplified.
Reformers are unlikely to be totally unsuccessful in
their attempts to promote global development and
to reduce poverty. Powerful populations are also
likely, at times, to reduce their relative advantage
to both forestall and weaken revolutionary
movements.
CONCLUSION
Ecosystem services are essential, but insufficient
for human well-being. Many societies have, in the
past, evolved social systems, including customs,
acknowledged boundaries, and reciprocities, with
which to manage and preserve ecosystem services
and human well-being on a local scale. However,
the rapid evolution of a globalized society, including
its global capacity to harvest and to damage
ecosystem services, has overwhelmed the capacity
of many of these institutions to cope with
contemporary issues. This places the well-being of
many—and ultimately perhaps all—populations at
risk. None of the four MA scenarios guarantees a
perfect future of ample ecosystem services and high
human well-being. However, Global Orchestration
and Adapting Mosaic, which are both characterized
by a more even global distribution of political and
economic power promise the greatest gain in human
well-being. Improved well-being in TechnoGarden
relies critically on the evolution of the institutional
frameworks, whereas Order from Strength (which
seems to at least offer security and well-being for
affluent populations) results in a decline in well-
being for the poor, and eventually also for the rich.
Levin (2000) concluded “our ability to live
sustainably in a global commons is dependent upon
adjusting normative behavior, and tightening
feedback loops more generally, so that individual
actions serve the common good.” We concur with
this conclusion, but remain sceptical that any of
these four scenarios provides a plausible route to
enable this, at least over the next 50 years. It seems
unwise to base the future of ecosystems and human
well-being upon any single strategy, be it economic
or technological, of decentralization or of
nationalism.
Synergies may exist between the most promising
aspect of each scenario in ways that can improve
human well-being. For example, the impulse toward
mutual development of rich and poor that
characterizes Global Orchestration could be
harnessed to develop the technologies of
TechnoGarden in ways to promote “technological
leapfrogging” (Reddy and Goldemberg 1990) in
developing countries. Many communities may be
attracted to the Adapting Mosaic scenario, provided
sufficient global governance to maintain a
reasonable level of security is retained.
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The scenarios assume that the future policy
direction is determined by either ecological caution
or disregard, and that economic policies favor either
a global or local focus. Although all scenarios are
vulnerable if sufficiently large-scale ecological and
social surprises occur, these appear least likely to
become catastrophic if the best elements of Global
Orchestration, Adapting Mosaic, and TechnoGarden
can be simultaneously developed. Finally, even
though Order from Strength provides the least
favorable future, its central insight—the recognition
that well-being requires security—must be
integrated into any sustainable future.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art30/responses/
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